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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of infrastructure capital on diﬀerent sources of
economic growth. Starting with the contribution of Barro (1990), the literature on
infrastructure and growth mainly focuses on the relation between private and public
capital investments. In contrast, we demonstrate a link between (telecommunication)
infrastructure capital and endogenous technological change in the context of an dy-
namic panel estimation applying aggregate country- as well as U.S. ﬁrm-level data.
The main empirical ﬁnding is that the increase in telecommunication infrastructure
during the last 30 years enhanced R&D investments but did not aﬀect the accumula-
tion of physical or human capital in our sample. Moreover, we provide an extended
R&D growth model, which emphasizes a cost-reducing feature of infrastructure cap-
ital, to demonstrate a potential link between the level of infrastructure capital and
endogenous technological change.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀect of (telecommunication) infrastructure capital on diﬀerent
sources of economic growth. That is, we investigate whether infrastructure investments
inﬂuence the accumulation of input factors, such as private and human capital, and/or
total factor productivity (TFP) and R&D.
1Several recent empirical contributions report a positive causal relation between infrastruc-
ture and GDP-growth for diﬀerent regions and time periods.1 The main empirical challenge
in these studies is the identiﬁcation of cause and eﬀects between infrastructure and growth.
Fernald (1999) shows that the rise in road services substantially increased the productivity
(TFP) across industry in the U.S. from 1953 to 1973.2 The author employs an implicit test
for endogeneity by showing that productivity growth is above average in vehicle intensive
industries. Roeller and Waverman (2001) formulate a structural model for the supply and
demand of telecommunication infrastructure to separate cause and eﬀects on aggregate pro-
duction.3 They ﬁnd large positive eﬀects of telecommunication investments on economic
growth in a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970-90. Belaid (2004) conﬁrms the re-
sults for a panel of 37 developing countries from 1985-2000. Finally, Calder´ on and Serv´ en
(2005) apply an (internal) instrumental variables approach to estimate a positive causal
eﬀect of diﬀerent infrastructure measures on GDP-growth in a panel of 121 countries from
1960-2000.
These studies highlight the importance of infrastructure investments to foster economic
growth and development. However, little is known about the explicit role of infrastructure
capital in the production process. Does it represent an additional input factor in the pro-
duction function or does it inﬂuence the technology with which other inputs are combined?
In other words, are infrastructure investments a complementary input factor to private and
human capital accumulation and/or do they trigger technical change by aﬀecting incentives
for R&D? In the ﬁrst case, infrastructure investments feature temporary growth eﬀects
in the presence of diminishing returns to capital while in the second they improve the eﬃ-
ciency of all other input factors and hence long-run productivity growth. The corresponding
policy implications diﬀer substantially in both settings. Moreover, in the former scenario,
infrastructure capital is expected to reﬂect a crucial growth determinant in less developed
countries, while it appears to be less important in R&D driven advanced economies. In
this regard, note that the empirical evidence above refers to advanced as well as developing
countries.4 Against this background, the present paper attempts to specify the mechanism
1Gramlich (1994) or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) survey the earlier empirical literature on infras-
tructure and growth.
2He measures a rate of return of 100% before 1973 and a negative rate from 1973-89. To put it in the
words of Fernandez et al. (2001): ”the interstate highway system was very productive, but a second one
would not be”.
3The identiﬁcation of cause and eﬀects crucially hinges on the speciﬁcation of demand and supply
functions and congruence of price elasticities across the OECD countries.
4Roeller and Waverman (2001) and Belaid (2004) quantify substantial elasticities of GDP with respect
to telephones per worker for advance (0.45) and developing countries (0.5) for similar time periods using
2that links infrastructure capital to economic growth in a sample consisting of advanced
countries as well as dynamic regions like China and Eastern Europe by accounting for dif-
ferent sources of economic growth. This approach sharpens the understanding of the link
between infrastructure and growth and allows to formulate more speciﬁc implications for
economic policy.
Most part of the theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth suggests that the pro-
vision of infrastructure aﬀects economic growth by interacting simultaneously with private
capital investments. This literature is substantially inﬂuenced by the work of Barro (1990)
who incorporates productive public capital in an extended two sector AK-growth model.
This approach lumps together private and infrastructure capital with intellectual capital
that is accumulated by technological progress. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that (broader)
capital accumulation, which is studied by neoclassical theory, and technological knowledge
are one and the same. In particular, Barro (1990) assumes a Cobb-Douglas production
function that features constant returns to scale for the accumulation of private and in-
frastructure capital because part of this accumulation is supposed to reﬂect technological
progress needed to counteract diminishing returns. It follows that infrastructure or private
capital investments feature not only level but also growth eﬀects in the long-run which are
only limited due to a ﬁnancing by distortionary taxes. Yet, the key assumption underlying
the Barro model is the link from infrastructure investments to private capital accumulation.5
The empirical part of our contribution is related the work of Fernald (1999), Bougheas et al.
(2000) and Hulten et al. (2003) who analyze the impact of infrastructure on productivity
and product specialization in the U.S. and India, respectively. Moreover, Ford and Poret
(1991) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of infrastructure capital on TFP-growth using cross-sectional
data of nine OECD countries. In contrast to these studies, we focus on diﬀerent sources
of economic growth and apply cross-country as well as U.S. ﬁrms panels. In particular,
we employ a dynamic panel analysis for 36 countries as well as over 3000 U.S. ﬁrms. The
rate of technical change is approximated by investments in R&D or TFP-growth. We
rely on internal as well as external instrumental variables to control for an endogeneity
infrastructure capital. In addition, we apply U.S. ﬁrm-level data to investigate the causal
identical estimation techniques.
5This approach has been generalized in several ways since - Turnovsky (1997) accounts for public capital
which is subject to congestion, Kosempel (2004) for the case of ﬁnitely lived households, Turnovsky (2000)
for an elastic labor supply and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) for an open-economy framework. An
alternative approach is followed by Bougheas et al. (2000) who show that infrastructure investments increase
an economy’s degree of specialization.
3eﬀect of changes in aggregate infrastructure on corporate investment decisions. We detect
that infrastructure investments enhance the rate of technical change measured by R&D or
TFP-growth in subsequent years in the country panel. Similarly, infrastructure capital is
found to boost R&D expenses of U.S. ﬁrms. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on investment rates in private or human capital. Our results reﬁne the outcomes of earlier
empirical studies outlined above and qualify the mechanisms and policy implications of
existing theories based on factor accumulation.
Moreover, we present a simple theoretical model in order to demonstrate a link between
infrastructure and technological progress.6 The distinction between the impact of infras-
tructure capital on private factor accumulation and technological progress is important at
least for two reasons: (i) it relates long-run productivity/GDP-growth to the stock of in-
frastructure capital instead of its growth rate (as in the former literature); (ii) it comprises
diﬀerent policy implications than the existing models which are based on neoclassical infer-
ence. That is, we identify policies that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of the R&D sector (higher
education, industrial and innovation policy, absorptive capacity), instead of neoclassical
policies that inﬂuence the saving behavior, to foster growth and innovations.
Section 2 brieﬂy illustrates some empirical stylized facts in favor of a positive relation be-
tween the provision of infrastructure and subsequent enhancements of TFP. In section 3, we
outline a simple model to illustrate a potential link between infrastructure and endogenous
technical change (R&D). Section 4 deﬁnes the empirical strategy to distinguish between
cause and eﬀects and reports the empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Infrastructure and TFP - some illustrations
In this section, we provide some illustrative stylized facts on the role of infrastructure
investments in the growth take-oﬀ of India and China since 1980. The two world’s largest
countries in population size represent two major success stories in terms of economic growth
during the last 30 years.
First, we refer to Rodrik (2005) to exemplify the importance of infrastructure investments
for productivity growth in India. The author reveals that the tremendous increase in
GDP/TFP-growth in India can not be explained by conventional theories. He shows that
6The theoretical part is related to Bougheas et al. (2000). However, in contrast to their contribution,
we explicitly endogenize technological change, account for dynamic interactions by modelling infrastructure
capital as a stock instead of a ﬂow variable and consider several model extensions.
4it was not accompanied by institutional reforms, trade liberalizations or enhancements of
property rights. In fact, India featured the second highest tariﬀ rates (50.5%) in the world
during the 1980s. Policy reforms in the corresponding legislations did not take place before
1991. Instead, as outlined in Figure 1, Rodrik underlines that the increase in TFP- and
hence GDP-growth was preceded by substantial investments in infrastructure. In addition,
he shows that most of the growth-acceleration took place in the manufacturing sector at
that time. Against this background, the author suggests that the increase in the provi-
sion of infrastructure services in India before 1980 augmented the subsequent productivity
in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the empirical work of Hulten et al. (2003) exactly
acknowledges this hypothesis for India.
Figure 2 and 3 plot the GDP- and TFP-growth rates together with major infrastructure
indices for India and China. The TFP values are computed as the residual from a human
capital augmented production function following the baseline speciﬁcation in Caselli (2005).
The infrastructure variables are the number of telephone lines per worker (telecom), the
share of paved roads in total roads (paved) and the length of the railroad network in km
per sqkm of land area (rail). We normalize the corresponding infrastructure indices in 1980
to display their performance before and after the growth take-oﬀ. The graphs demonstrate
that the growth-takeoﬀs around 1980 were mainly due to improvements in total factor
productivity. Moreover, they were preceded by major infrastructure investments in both
countries. In particular, Figure 2 illustrates that the provision of road and railroad services
increased substantially in India during the 1970s compared to the preceding decade. The
percentage of paved roads fell by 12% from 1960 to 1970, but increased by 21% during
the 1970s. In addition, the relative length of the railroad network was augmented by 74%
during the 1970s compared to 46% in the previous decade.
Figure 3 reveals a comparable pattern for China. The fraction of paved roads improved
by 62% in the 1970s contrasted to 35% in the 1960s. Similarly, the number of telephone
mainlines per worker was relatively constant in China before 1975 (overall increase by 8%)
while it increased by 47% in the following 10 years. Finally, Figure 2 and 3 display that
not only the growth take-oﬀs were preceded by substantial infrastructure investments but
also that the following periods were characterized by high productivity growth and ongoing
improvements in infrastructure services in both economies. While the latter feature might
as well reﬂect a reversed causality between the two variables, the former suggest a causal
link from infrastructure to growth.
5These case studies recommend a close connection between the provision of infrastructure
and subsequent productivity improvements in India and China. Our empirical analysis in
section 4 will approve this conjecture for a country panel that includes the OECD countries
as well as some dynamic transition countries from Eastern Europe and China.
3 The model
The aim of this section is to suggest a simple model that links the provision of infrastructure
capital in an economy to endogenous technical change and hence to growth in total factor
productivity. In contrast to the previous work, which is based on Barro (1990), we explicitly
interrelate the incentives of ﬁrms to invest in new technologies to the stock of infrastruc-
ture capital. Our framework follows the basic structure of growth models of endogenous
technological change ` a la Romer (1990). We extend this approach in two dimensions by
assuming that: (i) the use of a sizable variety of specialized intermediate goods in the pro-
duction of ﬁnal output is costly - e.g. due to transportation, coordination and search costs;
(ii) these costs are negatively related to the stock of infrastructure capital provided in the
economy. In this regard, Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994)
and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) ﬁnd robust empirical evidence for a negative relation
between ﬁrm-level business costs and the provision of infrastructure capital in the economy.
Moreover, Bougheas et al. (2000) detect a positive relation between infrastructure capital
and the costs of specialization in the intermediate sector for the U.S. economy. Accord-
ingly, we take this empirical evidence for a negative causation between infrastructure capital
and business costs for granted and embed this feature into a growth model of endogenous
technological change.7
The model setup consists of a competitive ﬁnal output sector, a monopolistic intermediate
goods sector and a law of motion for the stock of technologies.
Final output sector (Y ):
Competitive ﬁrms employ manufacturing labor (Ly) and a (symmetric) combination of all
varieties of specialized intermediate goods (xj) to produce a ﬁnal output good (Y ). As in
the basic model of Romer (1990) growth results from an increasing specialization of the
7For example, φ(G) represents that the appearance of a telecommunication network improves a ﬁrm’s
ability to sell/transmit specialized goods without a need to establish a widespread distribution system
(compare (Fernald and Ramnath, 2004)).
6intermediate goods sector. That is, each specialized intermediate good corresponds to a
new technology, whereas At denotes the stock of existing technologies. Hence ﬁnal output





j,tdj, α,β,χ > 0. We
assume that the production function features constant returns to scale in all input factors
(α + χ = 1) and normalize, for convenience, the price of the ﬁnal output good to one
(py = 1).8
The ﬁnal producer incurs expenses in paying for wages of manufacturing labor (wy) and
a price pI,j for each intermediate good. In addition, the ﬁnal producer needs to pay for
the transportation and coordination costs which are attached to the use of an extensive
variety of specialized intermediate inputs. We label these costs φ and assume that they are
negatively related to the provision of infrastructure capital in the economy. In particular,
we suppose that φ is a negative, continuous, monotonic function of the infrastructure capital
stock with the following properties: φ(G), φ0 < 0, φ00 > 0, limG→∞ → 1, limG→0 → ∞.
Thus, φ is convex, approaches a lower bound if G approaches inﬁnity and approaches inﬁnity
if G approaches 0. The lower bound represents the constraint that the price premium can
not become negative. The latter implies that intermediate specialization is not feasible in
the absence of infrastructure capital as costs approach inﬁnity. Moreover, we suppose that
the infrastructure capital stock is non-rival. Accordingly, φ(G) cannot be (fully) internalized
by the large number of intermediate producers due to a free-rider problem. Thus, φ acts like
a costly exogenous distortion of the interactions between intermediate and ﬁnal producers.
It raises the eﬀective price of an intermediate good and hence entails an additional markup
on the (monopolistic) prices for these goods. Finally, the transportation and coordination
costs φ are entirely real in that a low provision of infrastructure services induces ineﬃciencies
in combining a large variety of intermediates in ﬁnal production.9
Accordingly, the representative ﬁrm in the competitive ﬁnal output sector takes prices as











[1 + φ(Gt)]pI,j,txj,tdj − wy,tLy,t (1)
The ﬁnal producer determines its use of xj,t and Ly,t to maximize its proﬁt resulting in the
8The speciﬁc form of Y implies that the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent intermediate goods is
equal to one. Alternatively, we could have employed a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function as in Young (1993). In this case, the equilibrium growth rate depends on an additional parameter
measuring the degree of substitutability between input factors. Yet, as long as the substitutability is not
perfect, a higher provision of infrastructure capital is still growth-enhancing.















Intermediate capital goods sector (x):
Each intermediate sector j is monopolized since the innovation of a specialized inter-
mediate good creates market power. The intermediate producer can produce the input
j at a constant marginal cost of η units of the intermediate good. Hence, each mo-
nopolist chooses xj to maximize her proﬁts (πI,j) given the perceived inverse demand
function for each intermediate (pI,j,t). Because of symmetry the proﬁt function is the
same for all intermediate producers (pI,j = pI). Hence, we obtain the proﬁt function:11
πI = pI,jxj − ηxj = 1
1+φ(G)Lχ
yαxα
j,t − ηxj,t. Computing the ﬁrst-order condition and substi-
tuting for η results in:
πI = (1 − α)px (4)
R&D sector (A):
The rate of technological change ( ˙ A) is a positive function of research labor (LR), a pro-
ductivity parameter (λ) and its stock of knowledge (A):
˙ At = λLR,tAt (5)
Following Romer (1990), we implicitly assume that all researchers have free access to the
entire stock of knowledge, so that each new innovation/imitation induces a positive exter-
nality on future research. In this framework, an increase in population augments the rate
of technological change. There are several ways to eliminate such a scale eﬀect which would
not change our qualitative results. However, non-scale endogenous growth models would
complicate the model without aﬀecting the functioning of infrastructure capital. Instead,
we simply abstract from population growth (set L = 1).
Households:
Identical, inﬁnitely lived households maximize their utility from consumption (C) subject
to a resource constraint and No-Ponzi game conditions. The utility function supposes a
10Note that ﬁnal output ﬁrms demand the same amount of each intermediate so that xj = x, pj = p,




j dj hold because of symmetry.
11In the following, we concentrate on symmetric balanced growth equilibria, so that we can omit time
subscripts to simplify the notation.




1−σ , where σ is the degree of risk-aversion.






where rt is the real interest rate, ρ a time-preference rate and σ the degree of risk-aversion.
Solution for a balanced growth equilibrium:
In the following, we solve the model for a balanced growth equilibrium, in which A, G,
C and Y all grow at the same constant exponential rate. The key mechanism involving
technological progress is a free-entry condition into the research sector which translates
expected future proﬁts in the intermediate sectors into investments in R&D.12 In particular,
the free entry condition into R&D ensures that the present discounted value of expected
future proﬁts from a new innovation equals the costs for the production of a new design. If
we assume that monopoly proﬁts last forever the present discounted value equals π
r, where
r is the real interest rate. The costs of a new design are productivity adjusted wages paid
to research labor (
wR







In accordance with Romer (1990), we impose that the labor force is free to work in the
manufacturing or research sector so that in equilibrium wages in both sectors are equal
(wy = wR).13 Given the wage in manufacturing (3) and the proﬁt function (4), the free-





It follows from (5) that the equilibrium rate of technical change amounts to γ =
˙ A
A = λLR =
λ(1 − LY). We know from the production function that ﬁnal output grows with the rate
of technical change in a balanced growth equilibrium. Hence,
˙ C
C also grows at that rate.
Substituting for LY from (8) and r = γσ + ρ from (6) we obtain the growth rate for the
12Hellwig and Irmen (2001) show that expected future rents due to imperfect competition are not in
general necessary to ensure investments in R&D since intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking for
proﬁts can trigger such investments even in perfectly competitive markets.






α(1 − α)λ − χρ(1 + φ(G))
α(1 − α) + χσ(1 + φ(G))
(9)
We can infer from (9) that the growth rate of the stock of technologies is an increasing
function of the stock of infrastructure capital (
∂γ
∂G > 0). Since technological change is the
only source of GDP-growth in a balanced growth equilibrium, GDP also grows at that rate.14
Proposition I: Given the cost-reducing feature of non-rival infrastructure capital in the
intermediate goods sector and the assumptions underlying R&D based growth models ` a la
Romer (1990), it follows that the rate of technical change (and hence output growth) is an
increasing function of the stock of infrastructure capital (
∂γ
∂G > 0).
Intuitively, an increase in infrastructure capital augments the demand for specialized in-
termediate goods by reducing transportation and coordination costs that are associated
with the use of a large variety of intermediates in ﬁnal production. The increase in the
demand for intermediates, on the other hand, improves the incentives to invest in R&D.
Consequently, investments in infrastructure capital do not only inﬂuence the income level
of the economy but also its long-run balanced growth path. In section 3, we reported robust
empirical evidence in favor of Proposition I.
Besides, γ is a positive function of the productivity of the R&D sector (λ). This relation
is quite crucial since the eﬀectiveness of the domestic R&D measured by λ determines
the potential scale of the positive infrastructure externality on the incentive to invest in
R&D (formally:
∂2γ
∂G∂λ > 0). Hence, there exists a complementarity between the eﬀect of
infrastructure investments and the eﬀectiveness of the R&D sector. Since λ is exogenous
it represents all country-speciﬁc factors that are neglected in this model and that inﬂuence
the eﬀectiveness of the R&D sector, e.g. property rights, higher education, the ability do
adopt foreign technologies. If we set (9) equal to 0 we can compute the threshold level for





(1 + φ(G)) (10)
14The equilibrium growth rate suggests a minor technical restriction: In order to ensure that consumer’s
preferences are ﬁnite we need to impose that the growth of current utility (1−σ)γ is less than the discount
rate ρ.
10Thus, if the eﬀectiveness of the R&D sector is too low, infrastructure investments have
no growth eﬀect and the long-run TFP-level (At) remains constant. In this zero-growth
trap, the quality of the institutional framework, that determines the probability of suc-
cessful innovations, is not suﬃcient to ensure that the expected returns from investments
in R&D outweigh the costs for the given level of infrastructure capital.15 It follows that
a country requires to some degree a sound corporate R&D sector for being able to gain
sustainable from infrastructure investments. Note that an analog result applies to invest-
ments in the adoption of foreign (intermediate) technologies instead of R&D if the ability
to adopt foreign technologies depends on a country’s institutional framework and requires
corresponding corporate investments. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition II: Given the assumptions underlying Proposition I it follows that the growth-
eﬀect of infrastructure investments depends on the country-speciﬁc eﬃciency of the R&D
sector (
∂2γ
∂G∂λ > 0). If the latter is too low relative to the costs of R&D the economy is in a
zero growth trap and the long-run TFP level remains constant.
To illustrate the analogous results for the long-run TFP-level (A) we can solve the linear
diﬀerential equation (9). Hence, we obtain the following solution for the level of TFP:
At = A0 exp[Ω − Γ]t (11)
where Ω =
α(1−α)λ
α(1−α)+χσ(1+φ(G)) and Γ =
χρ(1+φ(G))
α(1−α)+χσ(1+φ(G)). If we take the limit for t → ∞ to






→ ∞ if Ω − Γ > 0





The condition Ω − Γ > 0 is of course equivalent to λ > λ∗.
In this respect, the model involves policy implications primarily applicable to less developed
countries: if the productivity of the domestic R&D sector (or analog the ability to adopt
foreign technologies) is too low, do not support investments in infrastructure capital (ﬁrst).
Expressing the same issue in a positive way: before investments in infrastructure capital
are carried out, supplementary policies or institutional changes to support corporate R&D
15Note that the growth rate cannot become negative because the re-allocation of human capital (L) from
research to manufacturing is bounded by 0.
11activities or the ability to adopt foreign technologies have to be implemented.
Note that we have taken the ﬁnancing structure of infrastructure capital as given in (9)
since we focus on the link from infrastructure to R&D and abstract from negative equilib-
rium growth-eﬀects due to a ﬁnancing by e.g. a distortionary income tax. However, the
long-run growth eﬀects of infrastructure capital is always positive as long as the ineﬃciency
of the decentralized equilibrium (due to the positive externality of G and A) and the asso-
ciated underinvestment in infrastructure capital outweighs an ineﬃciency from income tax
distortions. Finally, we note that there exist alternative speciﬁcations that can potentially
explain the link from infrastructure to R&D (and hence TFP-growth). In this respect, im-
provements in telecommunication infrastructure, in particular the internet, might feature a
direct eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of research labor (λ) and hence R&D investments. However,
this simple model is designed to demonstrate a potential connection between infrastructure
and R&D, which is independent of factor accumulation and underpins the empirical results
provided in the following section.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for a positive relation between investments
in telecommunication infrastructure and subsequent R&D intensities at the aggregate and
ﬁrm-level employing dynamic panel estimations. In addition, we ﬁnd no evidence for an
eﬀect on factor accumulation or human capital.
Data:
The OECD provides data for ”Main Science and Technology Indicators”for 36 (developed)
countries from 1980 until 2004.16 We employ the ”Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as
a percentage of GDP” to approximate the R&D intensities per country.17 To approximate
a country’s infrastructure capital stock, we use the number of telephone mainlines per 1000
worker (telewo). The series stems from the World Development Indicator database. This
database provides several diﬀerent infrastructure measures. However, these measures are
16The sample contains the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Argentina, China, Israel, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia.
17The highest fraction of R&D intensities was achieved in Israel in 2002 (5.08%) and the lowest in Greece
in 1982 (0.17%). In the U.S. the fraction was roughly around 2.7% during the 90s, which was apart from
Sweden, Israel and Japan the highest in the beginning of the 90s.
12highly correlated: the correlation coeﬃcient between a country’s telephone mainlines per
1000 worker and power generating capacity or the share of paved roads amount to .81 and
.61, respectively. Therefore, we exclusively focus on the role of telephone mainlines to avoid
problems of collinearity.
Moreover, we consider several variables to control for institutional diﬀerences over time
and across countries. In particular, we include real GDP per capita in purchasing power
parity (rgdp), government (gov) and private investment shares (inv) relative to real GDP,
trade openness (open), the amount of private credits issued by deposit money banks relative
to the level of GDP (credit), overall property rights (ppr).18 The ﬁrst four variables are
obtained from the Penn World Tables. The amount of private credits serves as a proxy for
the level of ﬁnancial development and comes from Levine et al. (2000) while the property
right index stems from various editions of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the
World database. Moreover, we use the growth rate of real GDP per capita in purchasing
power parity (gdp−growth) from the Penn World Tables and the average years of schooling
in the total population (tyr25) from Barro and Lee (1996) as an additional dependent and
control variables. Overall, our unbalanced panel covers 6 time observations for 36 countries.
Figure 4 and 5 show the scatter-plots for telephone mainlines per 1000 worker and the share
of private capital investments and R&D investments, respectively.
At the ﬁrm-level, we employ U.S. data from the Compustat database. The data relate to
the balance sheets of US nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and cover the time period 1970-2000. Speciﬁ-
cally, we include the following ﬁrm level data: R&D expenses, the amount of total assets
(assets), total sales (sales), operating income before taxes (oincome) and the amount of
long-term debt (debt). All variables are measured in millions of dollars. Overall, we have
an unbalanced panel consisting of over 3000 ﬁrms and six time observations. In addition,
we use the number of telephone mainlines per 1000 worker in the U.S. to investigate the
eﬀect of this macroeconomic infrastructure variable on ﬁrm level investment decisions.19 In
order to ensure that this aggregate variable does not capture general trends in GDP, we
also incorporate the U.S. real GDP per capita and the private investment share. Finally,
note that the mix of macro- and microeconomic data allows for an inspection of causal-
ity. In particular, the coeﬃcient of the telephone mainlines reﬂects the causal impact on
18We measure the number of telephone mainlines and real GDP in logs. Are other variables enter in
levels since they represent shares relative to GDP.
19We stress that our results based on the LSDV and the GMM diﬀerence estimator do not suﬀer from an
aggregation bias, as outlined by Moulton (1990), since we employ serial correlation robust standard errors
to avoid within-group correlation.
13(marginal) R&D expenses of a single ﬁrm since the latter has no feedback-eﬀect on the
aggregate level of infrastructure.
Estimation Procedure:
We use diﬀerent dynamic panel techniques to examine the coherence between our infras-
tructure variable and diﬀerent sources of economic growth. Accordingly, we control for
country (ﬁrm) ﬁxed eﬀects to account for unobservable, time-invariant factors that inﬂu-
ence infrastructure as well as R&D investments (e.g. institutions, geography). In addition,
we incorporate time ﬁxed eﬀects which control for common aggregated shocks over time.
We consider 5-year averages to smooth out business cycle eﬀects.20
Our strategy to address the problem of a potential endogeneity of infrastructure is three-
fold. First, we employ lagged numbers of telephone mainlines to exclude a reversed eﬀect
from R&D to infrastructure investments. Hence, we rely on internal instrumental vari-
ables as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). These are appropriate in the absence
of autocorrelation which is shown to hold in all conclusive speciﬁcations. We stress that
one would need to suppose that past levels of infrastructure investments are inﬂuenced by
expected future changes in R&D investments in order to justify a reversed causality in the
absence of autocorrelation. Second, we alternatively include a set of external instruments
provided by demographic variables. In particular, we account for the rate of urbanization
and the population density. The use of demographic variables as external instruments is
motivated by Roeller and Waverman (2001) and Canning (1999), who reveal that much of
the observed variations in infrastructure stocks are explained by these variables. Moreover,
Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005) use these demographic variables as external instruments for
the stock of infrastructure capital to estimate the eﬀect of infrastructure on GDP-growth
or income inequality in a large panel of over 100 countries. Third, we mix of macro- and
microeconomic in order to exclude a reversed eﬀect from ﬁrm level investments decisions
on aggregate macroeconomic variables. That is, we examine the eﬀect of the aggregate
U.S. telecommunication infrastructure stock on ﬁrm-level R&D expenses since the invest-
ment of a single ﬁrm has no contemporaneous feedback eﬀect on aggregate macroeconomic
variables.21
We employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM diﬀerence (GMM − dif) as well as the
20Speciﬁcally, we use the following non-overlapping time averages: 1075-1979, ..., 2000-2004.
21In addition, we include several ﬁrm-level and aggregate control variables and employ serial correlation
robust standard errors to preclude spurious correlations.
14Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM system estimator (GMM−sys) because of the signiﬁcance
of the lagged dependent variable (e.g. lagged R&D ratio). These estimation procedures are
based on the general method of moments (GMM) and are constructed to yield consistent
estimates in dynamic panels. In particular, Arellano and Bond (1991) estimate a dynamic
panel data model in ﬁrst diﬀerences and apply appropriate lagged levels as instruments
for the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the endogenous variables. These are valid instruments if (i) the
time-varying disturbance i,t is not serially correlated, and (ii) the explanatory variables
Xi,t are weakly exogenous. In other words, considering the following dynamic panel data
model in ﬁrst diﬀerences:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t − Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1), i = 1,2,...,N,t = 3,4,...,T,
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are:
E[yi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, for s ≥ 2;t = 3,...T
E[Xi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, for fors ≥ 2;t = 3,...T,
where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t a vector of endogenous and exogenous explanatory
variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-periods, i,t the error term
and α and β parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) apply
supplementary moment restrictions on the original model in levels, whereby lagged diﬀer-
ences are used as additional instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables
in levels. Given that E[yi,t,µi] is mean stationary, the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator
incorporates the additional moment restrictions:
E[(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0,
E[(Xi,t−1 − Xi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0.
Hence, they require the additional assumption of no correlation between the diﬀerences of
these variables and the country-speciﬁc eﬀect. The authors show that this procedure is more
eﬃcient if explanatory variables are persistent. In all conclusive estimation speciﬁcations,
we apply heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and cluster errors at the country (ﬁrm)
level to obtain standard errors that are also robust to serial correlation. Furthermore, we
consider all variables as potentially endogenous apart from the government share and the
overall property rights.
15Results - R&D:
Table 1 reports the eﬀects of telephone mainlines and the institutional controls on the gross
domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP. The ﬁrst column reports a negative
contemporaneous correlation between telephone mainlines and the share of R&D after con-
trolling for the institutional and ﬁnancial indicators. We include the contemporaneous as
well as the ﬁrst lag of the control variables to preclude spurious correlations. Correspond-
ingly, the negative correlation does not simply capture an economy’s degree of ﬁnancial or
institutional development. In the next column, we apply the least square dummy variable
estimator to additionally control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of infrastructure
is still signiﬁcant on a 1% level. Yet, the corresponding estimates are biased in the presence
of a lagged dependent variable. Therefore, we present the results of the GMM diﬀerence
estimator, which is based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and yields consistent estimates in
dynamic panels, in column three. Accordingly, we ﬁnd that an increase in telephone main-
lines by 1% enhances aggregate R&D investments on average by .29% in the subsequent 5
years. The result is signiﬁcant even on a 1% signiﬁcance level and is robust to the exclusion
of any (combination of) institutional variables. In contrast, only the level of real GDP and
a country’s degree of openness inﬂuenced aggregate R&D investments signiﬁcantly. More-
over, we can not reject the validity of our (internal) instruments according to the Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions or the test for second order autocorrelation. For example,
the number of telephone mainlines per worker increased in the U.S. from 1975 until 1980 by
roughly 2%. According to our estimation result, this rise triggered an increase in the R&D
share by .58% in the years between 1980 and 1984, which amounts to 21% of the overall
R&D share in that period.
In the following columns, we apply the GMM system estimator, which is based on Blundell
and Bond (1998) and is more eﬃcient than the previous one in the presence of persistent
variables. In column four, we exclusively include our infrastructure indicator as well as
the government share and the index of property rights, which we consider as exogenous
to R&D, in order to report the results for a reduced size of the instrumental variable ma-
trix.22 Column ﬁve includes all control variables and column six additionally accounts for
time ﬁxed eﬀects. In all speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that an increase in the number of telephone
22Here, we account for all lagged levels and diﬀerences of telephone mainlines as internal instruments.
In the following, we exclusively use the ﬁrst two appropriate lags of the endogenous variables to avoid
overﬁtting - a large number of instruments relative to the number of cross sections (countries).
16mainlines promotes R&D investments in the subsequent years. The corresponding coef-
ﬁcients are signiﬁcant on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Finally, in the last two
columns, we use our set of exogenous demographic indicators to instrument for a country’s
infrastructure capital stock in a given period. That is, we drop the internal instruments
for the infrastructure variable and instead impose a country’s rate of urbanization and its
population density as an exogenous instruments.23 Column eight, our preferred estimation
speciﬁcation, suggests that a 1% increase in the number of telephone mainlines per worker
augments the share of aggregate R&D relative to GDP by .24%. This eﬀect even amounts
to .35% if we additionally impose time ﬁxed eﬀects. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant on a
1% level, respectively. Finally, the Hansen test and the test for second order autocorrela-
tion conﬁrm the validity of our instruments and suggest that our model is well speciﬁed.
Summing up, we ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of a positive causal eﬀect running from a
country’s stock of infrastructure to its aggregate R&D investments.
Results - factor accumulation:
The previous ﬁndings suggest that adjustments in R&D link improvements in the provision
of infrastructure capital to economic growth in subsequent periods in our sample consist-
ing of China, OECD and Eastern European countries. That, is amendments in aggregate
R&D represent an important transmission mechanism in the infrastructure growth nexus.
In Table 2, we examine the impact of infrastructure capital on the alternative sources of
economic growth, which according to an human capital augmented production function
are represented by accumulations in private and human capital. In the ﬁrst four columns,
we report the eﬀect of improvements in the number of telephone mainlines per worker on
aggregate private investments. Accordingly, we are not able to detect a positive impact of
infrastructure capital on private capital accumulation which is signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. In contrast, we ﬁnd that an increase in a country’s degree of trade openness pro-
mote private capital investments. Again, the speciﬁcation tests can not reject that our
dynamic panel data model is well speciﬁed. Hence, improvements in telecommunication in-
frastructure do not aﬀect private capital investments if we correctly control for institutional
measures or time ﬁxed eﬀects in our sample. In columns ﬁve to six of Table 2, we apply
an alternative measure for the private investment share since R&D expenditures amount,
by deﬁnition, for a fraction of the overall private investments. Therefore, we construct an
23All other endogenous variables are still instrumented by their suitable own lags (internal instruments).
17adjusted measure of private capital investments, net of R&D expenditures.24 However, we
are still not able to reveal stimulating eﬀects of infrastructure investments on private capital
accumulation. Finally, the last two columns of Table 2 show that infrastructure investments
have no inﬂuence on the growth rate or the level of education, measured by the average
number of years of schooling for a given country or time period, in our sample.
The previous ﬁndings are striking. First, they challenge the conventional growth theories
which link growth-promoting eﬀects of infrastructure investments to a stimulation of private
capital investments, compare e.g. Barro (1990). Our results reject this complementarity
between public (infrastructure) and private capital investments. Instead, they suggest a
direct eﬀect of telecommunication infrastructure on technical change in advanced countries
and dynamic regions which is independent from private or human capital accumulation.
Second, the impact of infrastructure on R&D features diﬀerent policy implications. That
is, the growth-eﬀect of infrastructure investments depends on factors such as intellectual
property rights, the degree of product market competition or tertiary education instead of
factors that inﬂuence a household’s saving decision.
Results - productivity growth:
In the following, we investigate if the interplay between infrastructure and R&D indeed
causes productivity growth in our sample. Therefore, we estimate the eﬀect of the lagged
values of telephone mainlines on the growth rate of real GDP per capita in purchasing
power parities. In line with the empirical growth literature, we include the lagged (initial)
level of GDP as a lagged dependent variable in the growth regression.25 Accordingly, we
apply a dynamic panel data model. Moreover, we account for the average years of schooling
of citizens above 25, our measure of human capital, as a supplementary control variable.
It follows that the infrastructure coeﬃcient in the growth regression measures the impact
on GDP-growth net of private or human capital investments. Therefore, variations in the
growth rate of GDP, after controlling for movements in factor inputs, represent by deﬁnition
variations in TFP-growth. Table 3 lists the results for the growth regressions. The ﬁrst
two columns report a positive correlation between the number of telephone mainlines and
productivity growth. Column three to ﬁve display the results of the GMM diﬀerence and
24That is, we subtract the share of R&D investments from the share of overall investments to obtain the
adjusted values.
25The corresponding coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant on a 1% level in all estimation speciﬁcations.
Compare e.g. Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
18system estimation following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
respectively. We detect a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of telephone mainlines on productivity
growth, whereby the exogeneity of infrastructure can not be rejected. Moreover, we ﬁnd
evidence that economic growth is positively related to the degree of trade openness, the
private investment share and the index of overall property rights. These estimates are based
on the use of internal instruments for the endogenous variables such as infrastructure. In
contrast, we employ our exogenous demographic instruments for infrastructure in column
six of Table 3. Accordingly, an increase in the infrastructure capital stock signiﬁcantly
enhances economic growth, net of amendments in factor inputs.
In columns seven to nine of Table 3, we include the aggregate share of R&D instead of the
infrastructure variable. Column seven reveals that an increase the aggregate R&D share
augments economic growth. The corresponding coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant on a 1% level.
In column eight, we incorporate lagged levels and diﬀerences of the number of telephone
mainlines as an exogenous instrument for the aggregate R&D share (instead of lagged levels
and diﬀerences of the R&D share itself). That is, we test if the growth-eﬀect of telephone
mainlines is indeed transmitted via R&D investments. In other word, if Y represents GDP,
R&D the aggregate share of R&D, I the infrastructure measure, X the control variables,
 the error term and α0,1,2, β0,1,2 parameters, we estimate the following equation by the
GMM-based method of Blundell and Bond (1998):
∆Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t−1 + β2(R&D)i,t + X
0
i,tβ3 + ηi + i,t (13)
whereby we treat R&D as endogenous and model it respectively as:
(R&D)i,t = α0 + α1Ii,t + X
0
i,tα2 + ηi + i,t (14)
In accordance with our previous results, column eight reveals that R&D, which is instru-
mented by lagged levels and diﬀerences of the number of telephone mainlines, promotes
productivity growth. The corresponding coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant on a 1% level. Finally, in
column nine, we use lagged levels and diﬀerences of our exogenous infrastructure instru-
ments - the rate of urbanization and the population density - as instruments for the R&D
share. Again, the results suggest that the eﬀect of the exogenous infrastructure instruments
is transmitted via adjustments in aggregate R&D. It follows that a substantial part of the
impact of telephone mainlines on TFP-growth can be explained by its eﬀect on private
19R&D investments.
In the last column of Table 3, we account for interaction terms between the infrastructure
variable and institutional factors. In particular, we interact the lag value of the number
of telephone mainlines with the property rights indicator from the Fraser Institute of Eco-
nomic Freedom. In accordance with the prediction of our theoretical model, we ﬁnd that
the interaction term between the infrastructure and the institutional variable is positive
and signiﬁcant on a 5% level. That is, the eﬀect of an increase in the number of telephone
mainlines on R&D is augmented if the index of overall property rights improves. The re-
sult conﬁrms that the eﬀect of infrastructure on R&D investments increases in the quality
of institutions. Hence, we detect a complementarity in the eﬀectiveness of infrastructure
investments that supports our theoretical results summarized in Proposition II.
Results - ﬁrm-level R&D investments:
In Table 4, we report the eﬀect of telephones mainlines on ﬁrm-level R&D investments in
the U.S. In line with the previous estimations, we focus on a growth frequency of 5-year-
averages. The application of disaggregated data has the advantage that a corresponding
correlation between ﬁrm-level decisions and macroeconomic variables can be interpreted as
a causal eﬀect running from the latter to the former. The ﬁrst column displays that an
increase in telephone mainlines per worker augments corporate investments in R&D after
controlling for changes in corporate sales, assets and operating income or aggregate real
GDP and private investments. In the second column, we additionally control for ﬁrm-level
ﬁxed eﬀects. The results reveal a positive impact of telephone mainlines on ﬁrm-level R&D
expenses, however, the coeﬃcient is biased due to the presence of the lagged dependent
variable. Finally, the last two column report the estimates for the GMM diﬀerence proce-
dure. We consider the ﬁrm-level variables as endogenous and the macroeconomic variables
as exogenous. In column three, we exclusively control for corporate sales and aggregate
real GDP. Accordingly, an increase of 10 new telephone mainlines per 1000 worker induces
an increase in corporate R&D investments on average by 5.36 MIO$. The corresponding
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant on a 5% level. In the last column, we account for all corporate
and macroeconomic control variables. This enhances the coeﬃcient of the infrastructure
variable, but also the estimated standard errors. Yet, the corresponding coeﬃcient is still
signiﬁcant on a 10% level. Overall, the ﬁrm-level results support the hypothesis that in-
frastructure investments improve the terms of ﬁrms to invest in R&D.
20Summing up, the empirical ﬁndings suggest that the relation between infrastructure and
growth is not linked to factor accumulation in our sample. This ﬁnding contradicts the
predictions of the theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth, which was initiated
by Barro (1990). Instead, we demonstrate that the provision of (telecommunication) in-
frastructure boosts productivity growth and investments in new technologies (R&D).
5 Conclusion
This article decomposes the growth eﬀect of infrastructure investments. It suggests that
infrastructure aﬀects innovative investments and technological change instead of factor ac-
cumulation.
The empirical section provides evidence in favor of the identiﬁed mechanism from a dynamic
panel estimation. We ﬁnd that investments in (telecommunication) infrastructure cause an
increase in R&D investments in subsequent periods. Therefore, we conﬁrm Proposition I
of our theoretical model. We control for a potential endogeneity of infrastructure by (i)
including internal as well as exogenous instruments for infrastructure and (ii) analyzing the
eﬀect of macroeconomic aggregates on ﬁrm-level investment decisions. Moreover, we detect
that infrastructure promotes total factor productivity growth via adjustments in aggregate
R&D and conﬁrm that the eﬀect of infrastructure on R&D investments increases in the
quality of institutions. Hence, our results also conﬁrm Proposition II of the theoretical
model. Finally, we are not able to detect a positive relation between the provision of
infrastructure and private investments in physical or human capital.
The empirical ﬁndings are striking since they challenge conventional growth theories which
link growth-promoting eﬀects of infrastructure investments to a stimulation of private cap-
ital investments. Our results reject this complementarity between public (infrastructure)
and private capital investments. Instead, they suggest a direct eﬀect of telecommunica-
tion infrastructure on technical change which is independent from private or human capital
accumulation in our set of knowledge-intensive regions. The impact of infrastructure on
R&D features diﬀerent policy implications. That is, the growth-eﬀect of infrastructure in-
vestments depends on factors such as intellectual property rights, the degree of product
market competition or tertiary education instead of factors that inﬂuence a household’s
saving decision.
In addition, we suggest a theoretical mechanism that complies with this empirical ﬁnding.
21In particular, we illustrate a positive link between the provision of infrastructure capital
and the incentives to invest in R&D. This result is based on the assumption that infrastruc-
ture capital reduces costly ineﬃciencies due to transportation and coordination costs that
stem from the use of a large variety of intermediate goods in the ﬁnal production sector.
Moreover, the model implies crucial complementarities between infrastructure capital and
other factors that inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the R&D sector.
The connection between infrastructure and technical change reﬁnes the link between in-
frastructure and growth and helps to explore productivity diﬀerences across countries. The
results suggest that future work on the link between infrastructure and growth should be
devoted to its eﬀect on innovative activities and technical change.
22Figure 1: India - GDP- vs. TFP-growth
Figure 2: India - Transportation infrastructure and TFP-growth
23Figure 3: China - Transportation/telecommunication infrastructure and TFP-growth
24Figure 4: Scatter-Plot: Private investments share and telephone mainlines
Figure 5: Scatter-Plot: Share of industry-ﬁnanced R&D investments and telephone main-
lines
25Table 1 - Eﬀect of telephone mainlines on share of R&D investments
R&D share
OLS LSDV GMM-diﬀ GMM-sys1)
l1telewo .1870∗∗∗ .4866∗∗∗ .2915∗∗ .1838∗ .2842∗∗ .4506∗∗∗ .2406∗∗ .3598∗∗∗
(2.73) (3.61) (2.01) (1.79) (2.43) (3.06) (2.11) (2.59)
l1R&D 1.04∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ .9814∗∗∗ .9828∗∗∗ .9477∗∗∗ .9875∗∗∗ .9618∗∗∗ .9929∗∗∗
(22.59) (6.83) (5.18) (11.28) (10.02) (10.15) (12.13) (12.19)
rgdp .0576 -2.73∗∗∗ -1.79∗ .0698 -.3202 .1341 -.1952
(.14) (-3.36) (-1.91) (.35) (-1.22) (.80) (-.91)
l1rgdp -.2385 .1088
(-.65) (.19)
gov .0098 -.0014 -.0027 .1838 .0105 .0033 .0130∗ .0075
(1.18) (-.17) (-.40) (1.31) (1.39) (.44) (1.65) (.95)
l1gov .0041 -.0014∗
(.52) (-1.73)
ppr .1183∗∗∗ .0207 -.0033 .0398 .0577 .1407∗∗ .0493 .1273∗∗∗
(3.28) (.46) (-.10) (1.45) (1.19) (2.45) (1.12) (2.59)
l1ppr -.0246 .0108
(-.77) (.19)
credit .1609 .0208 .0658 -.2054 -.2877∗ -.2163 -.2993∗∗
(.93) (.20) (.38) (-1.38) (-1.78) (-1.59) (-2.10)
l1credit -.4590∗∗ -.3691
(-2.61) (-1.51)
open .0004 .0132∗∗ .0010∗ -.0016 -.0004 -.0014 -.0009
(.08) (2.64) (1.91) (-1.37) (-.30) (-1.32) (-.73)
l1open -.0012 -.0027
(-.20) (-.69)
inv -.0157 .0203 .0077 .0113 .0140 .0110 .0109
(-.88) (1.04) (.61) (1.22) (1.54) (1.43) (1.50)
l1inv .0298∗ -.0116
(1.84) (-.87)
Country/Obs. 108 34/108 33/77 36/114 34/111 34/111 34/111 34/111
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no no no yes no yes
Speciﬁcation tests (p-value):
2. order serial correlation .971 .855 .936 .805 .958 .734
Hansen-test .953 .164 .994 .998 .998 .998
1) in column 7-8 we use internal instruments for R&D determinants except for infrastructure variable.
for infrastructure use lagged levels as well as diﬀerences of external instruments (urban, pop. density)
in columns 5-8 we employ only the ﬁrst two appropriate lags of the endogenous variables to reduce the
number of instruments. 5-year averages 1975-2004 data. all regressions include a constant term, and employ
heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-8 we include s.e. that are robust to within group correlation.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
26Table 2 - Eﬀect of telephone mainlines on factor accumulation
inv-share inv-adj tyr25-growth tyr25
OLS LSDV GMM-sys GMM-sys LSDV GMM-sys
l1telewo .6641 1.46 .8675 .4716 .9220 .5507 -.0132 -.0168
(1.37) (1.53) (.52) (1.01) (1.04) (.40) (-.60) (-.20)
lag-dep. var. .6532∗∗∗ .3360∗∗∗ .7184∗∗∗ .7472∗∗∗ .7039∗∗∗ .7337∗∗∗ - .8910∗∗∗
(10.70) (3.86) (8.26) (9.78) (7.54) (7.95) - (33.87)
rgdp 17.88∗∗∗ 24.23∗∗∗ -1.10 -.5412 -.5363 -.3915 -.1997∗∗∗ .1702
(5.12) (4.86) (-.77) (-.30) (-.24) (-.22) (-4.43) (1.19)
l1rgdp -17.72∗∗∗ -23.03∗∗∗
(-5.87) (-5.91)
gov -.0283 -.0014 -.0302 -.0155 .0629 .0643 .0001 -.0064
(-.48) (-1.36) (-.89) (-.45) (1.34) (1.23) (.08) (-1.06)
l1gov -.0339 -.0411
(-.35) (-.70)
ppr -.0404 -.3957 .3845 .2774 .3956 .3829 .0068 .0152
(-.10) (-1.00) (.76) (.48) (.71) (.72) (.55) (.30)
l1ppr -.0363 -.0411
(-.20) (-.70)
credit .9118 4.14∗∗∗ .2816 .2775 -.3940 -.1922 -.0005 -.0600
(.64) (3.35) (.19) (.19) (-.34) (-.17) (-.02) (-.27)
l1credit -.2641 -2.12
(-.20) (-1.31)
open -.0081 -.0723 .0172∗∗ .0145∗∗ .0103 .0077 .0014 -.0014∗∗∗
(-.18) (-1.46) (2.38) (2.36) (1.62) (.77) (1.33) (-2.70)
l1open .0214 .0456
(.41) (1.23)
Country/Obs. 147 35/147 35/155 35/155 33/106 33/106 35/155 35/155
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no yes no yes no no
Speciﬁcation tests (p-value):
2. order serial correlation .924 .993 .936 .723 .357
Hansen-test .999 .998 .972 .948 .988
in columns 3-6 and 8 we employ only the ﬁrst two appropriate lags of the endogenous variables to reduce the
number of instruments. 5-year averages 1975-2004 data. all regressions include a constant term, and employ
heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-8 we include s.e. that are robust to within group correlation.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
27Table 3 - Eﬀect of telephone mainlines on productivity growth
GDP-growth
OLS LSDV GMM-diﬀ GMM-sys1) GMM-sys2)
l1telewo .8749∗∗ .6940 1.56∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗ 1.54∗∗
(1.98) (1.39) (1.89) (4.50) (4.83) (2.42) (2.17)
l1rgdp -3.36∗∗∗ -6.52∗∗∗ -6.84∗∗∗ -4.54∗∗∗ -4.66∗∗∗ -3.18∗∗∗ -4.12∗∗∗ -4.13∗∗∗ -3.63∗∗∗ -3.87∗∗∗
(-3.78) (-4.51) (-2.71) (-2.77) (-6.20) (-3.62) (-3.40) (-4.59) (-3.33) (-2.91)
gov -.0065 .0078 -.0350 .1838 -.0213 -.0245 -.0822∗∗∗ -.0831∗∗∗ -.0608∗ -.0064
(-.15) (.20) (-.73) (-1.36) (-.71) (-.72) (-2.61) (-2.78) (-1.95) (-.20)
l1gov .0016 -.0288
(.04) (-.68)
ppr .2740 -.0516 .0526 .6186∗ .4907∗∗ .3338 .2251 .0162 .2567 .5406
(1.16) (-.16) (1.82) (1.45) (1.99) (1.32) (.70) (.07) (.84) (1.42)
l1ppr .3140∗ .1386
(1.70) (.79)
credit .1663 -1.42 .4152 .5019 .2388 1.35 1.02
(.13) (-1.19) (.29) (.19) (-1.59) (.93) (1.01)
l1credit -.1605 .1796
(-.14) (.18)
open .0118 .1090∗∗∗ .0437∗ .0103 .0200∗∗∗ .0197∗∗∗ .0187∗∗∗
(.40) (4.55) (1.67) (1.18) (2.61) (2.75) (2.58)
l1open -.0054 -.0260
(-.16) (-1.17)
inv .2490∗∗∗ .2046∗∗∗ .0725 .1257∗ .1614∗∗∗
(3.43) (2.62) (.62) (1.93) (4.02)
l1inv -.1383∗∗ -.2227
(2.06) (-3.60)∗∗∗
tyr25 .1975 -.5983 .4118 .2168 -.5056∗
(.56) (-1.12) (.75) (1.05) (1.65)
l1tyr25 -.1169 .5611
(-.32) (1.22)




Country/Obs. 147 35/147 35/118 36/158 35/153 36/158 35/142 35/142 35/142 36/152
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no no no yes yes yes yes -
Speciﬁcation tests (p-value):
2. order serial correlation .227 .367 .250 .242 .085 .103 .214 .370
Hansen-test .702 .050 .999 .841 .932 .916 .984 .511
1) see Table 2. 2) in column 8 and 9 we use ﬁrst lag of infrastructure variable and demographic variables as exogenous
instruments for the R&D share, respectively in columns 5-8 we employ only. the ﬁrst two appropriate lags of the endogenous
variables to reduce the number of instruments. 5-year averages 1975-2004 data. all regressions include a constant term, and
employ heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-8 we include s.e. that are robust to within group correlation. t-statistics in
parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 28Table 4 - Eﬀect of telephone mainlines on ﬁrm-level R&D investments
R&D investments
OLS LSDV GMM-diﬀ GMM-diﬀ
telewo .6599∗ .9840∗∗∗ .5360∗∗ .6054∗
(1.78) (2.67) (2.47) (1.83)
l1R&D 1.23∗∗∗ .5415∗∗∗ .8731∗∗∗ .4115
(16.51) (3.86) (3.08) (1.28)
assets -.0023 -.0074∗∗∗ -.0039
(-1.63) (-3.90) (-.26)
sales .0048 .0374∗∗∗ .0043 .0562
(1.52) (3.29) (.33) (1.49)
oper. income .0128 .0261 -.1118
(.61) (.72) (-1.22)
rgdp -.0085∗ -.0122∗∗∗ -.0045∗ -.0076
(1.80) (-2.78) (-1.76) (-1.56)
inv -3.91 -.0116 1.35
(-1.24) (-2.45) (.50)
Firms/Obs. 6041 3017/6041 1656/3018 1654/3016
country FE no yes yes yes
time FE no no no no
Speciﬁcation tests (p-value):
2. order serial correlation .146 .345
Hansen-test .220 .224
5-year averages 1970-1999 data. all regressions include a constant term,
and employ heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-4 we include
s.e. that are robust to within group correlation. t-statistics in
parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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